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An invers e associ ation is gener ally observ ed betwee n
inequ ality in the

size distri bution of person al income s and the level of per capita
income in
a countr y (Kuzn ets, 1955).

Severa l aspect s of the demog raphic compo sition of

popula tions may accoun t for this assoc iation betwee n economic develo
pment and
aggreg ate income inequ ality. In the long run, modern economic
growth may
contri bute to changi ng death and birth rates and social organ izatio
n, which
in turn modify the age struct ure of the popula tion and the compo
sition and
size distri butio n of famili es.

If a substa ntial share of aggreg ate income in

equal ity is linked to these demog raphic featur es of popul ations
, a decom position of income inequ ality based on these featur es might help to
unders tand
the pro~im ate origin s of trends and cross sectio nal patter ns in
aggreg ate in
equal ity. Moreo ver, it may be argued that the inequ ality associ
ated with
certai n demog raphic featur es, such as the age struct ure, is not
neces sarily an
indica tion of the degree of lifetim e inequ ality among person s,
and may, there
fore, be tentat ively exclud ed from welfar e compa risons of econom
ic inequ ality.
Thus, the causal origin s and the norma tive signif icance of aggreg
ate inequ ality
may be clarif ied by such decom positio ns.
This paper report s two approa ches to decompose income inequ ality,
ap
proxim ated by the varian ce of the logari thms of income (log varian
ce), into
compo nents associ ated, first, with the age struct ure of indivi duals
with income ,
and second , by the number of adults and childr en (per adult) in
famili es.
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First,da ta for three countrie s are used to illustra te how variatio n
in age structur es may help to account for observed patterns of aggrega te
income inequal ity.

The data for Colombia are then analyzed further to explore

the relation ship between family composi tion and family income.

Two element s

of family composi tion are disting uished- -fertilit y and the decision of adults
to share living arrangem ents.

The number of children that parents want

may respond to incomes, relative prices, and wage rates of parents; the rela
tionship between fertilit y and adult incomes can be interpre ted, in this context ,
as a simple demand equation , albeit one that is subject to bias by the omission
of other factors affectin g reprodu ctive demands that are probably correlat ed
with adult incomes .

The propens ity of adults to live together may be interpre ted

similarl y as a choice of adults that is conditio ned by their economic resourc es.
It may alternat ively be viewed as a producti on relation ship linking the pro
ductive contribu tions of adult workers , who contribu te differen tially with the
growth of family scale, to total family income.

These static decompo sitions

of income inequal ity provide suggesti ve explana tions for how economic develop 
ment may affect over tinethe distribu tion of persona l incomes, and how the
path of demogra phic transiti on modifies the rate of income growth and its
persona l distribu tion across a society and within a society across generati ons.
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AGE STRUCTURE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME
The age structures of populations differ substantially from country to country
and within a single country over time.

These differences reflect the level

of and predominantly recent changes in birth and death rates.

High birth

rates yield a younger age structure in the long run, and low birth rates an
older structure.

Recent sharp declines in mortality rates in low income

countries have been larger among infants and children than they have been
for adults.

This has had a similar effect on the age structure of these

populations as would an increase in fertility, namely, increasing the rate
of growth of the youngest age groups relative to older age groups.

Most low

income countries, therefore, have experienced a shift in their age structure,
after World War II, with the share of children increasing.· These relatively
large surviving birth cohorts from the post-war period have in the 197Os
entered the labor force and begun to earn income.

In those countries that

have experienced declines in fertility, the proportion of the population in
the youngest age groups has, conversely, fallen and in time the age structure
of the labor force will tend to become older.
The secular decline in mortality rates in high income countries has
exerted a less pronounced effect on the age structure of these populations,
because mortality was already in this century at a lower level and the de
cline was more uniformly distributed across age groups.

But notable long

swings in birth rates occurred in some high income countries, such as the
United States after the 192Os, and perturbed age-structures.

The rise in

birth rates following World War II created a relatively large birth cohort
to be absorbed into the labor force in the 197Os, whereas the Great De-
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pression produced a shortfa ll in births and thus a relative ly small cohort
of labor force entrants to satisfy the growth in labor demands in the 1950s.
Given the current variatio n across countrie s in age structur es and our
capacity to project future swings in these structur es, it would seem useful
to assess how age structur es affect, directly and indirec tly, the distribu tion
of persona l income, and how aggrega te economic developments and individu al
behavio r respond to and modify these effects of the age structur e on measured
income "inequa lity."

The Logarith mic Variance of Persona l Incomes and Its Decomposition by Age
Several measures of inequal ity can be decomposed into elements asso
ciated with a particu lar populati on charact eristic; the log variance can
be resolved , as any variance can, into between and within group variance
components as reported below. l

Such decompo sitions are insightf ul if they

distingu ish between differen t sources of inequal ity with differen t implica 
tions for economic welfare or policy and if they clarify empiric al regular i
ties that can be interpre ted as camal relation ships.
The analysis in this section of the paper focuses on individu al
money incomes .
ance,

Our aggrega te measure of economic inequal ity, the log vari

V(y), is resolved into three portions associat ed with (1) the age

structur e of the income recipien t populat ion, (2) the profile of incomes
received on average by persons of differen t ages, and (3) the income in
equality within these differen t age groups.

5
V(y) • tt(y - y ) 2
ji
ij

(1)

where

is the natural logarithm of the i th individual in the j th age

group with a positive income in the preceding time period, yj is the mean
of of logarithmic incomes in the j th age group,

y

is the overall mean of

logarithmic incomes, nj is the number of persons of age j with a positive
income, and thus

N = tnj.
j

The Age Structure
The first term, nj/N, is the weight or relative frequency of the age
groups in the population of income recipients and can modify measured aggre
gate income inequality without necessarily affecting lifetime income oppor
tunities of individuals.

Intertemporal or cross country comparisons may

be confounded by differences in age structure, and few empirical studies of
income inequality have attempted to isolate or remove this demographic
source of measured inequality.

As with index numbers, there is no streight

forward method to normalize adequately for variation in quantity weights
(i.e., age structure), because the other two components of income inequali
ty are likely to differ across observations.

The broad variations in income

inequality that are empirically documented generally parallel variation in
age structures; though many other factors are probably involved in generating
these patterns in inequality, the effects of age structure warrant further
quantitative analysis.
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For example, if a large fraction of young workers in a population
increases meastred aggregate income inequality, as appears to be the case in
the United States, several empirical regularities first noted by Kuznets
(1955, 1963) might be explained by variation in age structures.

(1)

In

the advanced stages of industrialization and urbanization, particularly in
the 20th century, a number of countries, including the United States, evi
dence declining income inequality.

This pattern of change in inequality

over time is consistent with the changes in age structure that accompanied
the secular decline in fertility in these countries during this period.
(2) Low income countries report today greater income inequality, by most
summary measures, than do high income industrially advanced countries.
Less developed countries have recently sustained higher levels of fertility
than have the more developed countries and their consequent younger age structures
could explain this cross country pattern in income inequality.

(3) Some data

suggest that inequality increased during the early stages of industrialization
in the United States (Lindert and Williamson, 1976), and may also have increased
recently in some low income countries, such as India.

The earlier noted shifts

in age structure in many low income countries stemming from the age pattern of
mortality declines could account for some deterioration in measured income in
equality in the current period.

High fertility and immigration were sufficient

in the United States to increase the ratio of men age 15 to 24 to all men 15
or older until about 1820.

This ratio, corresponding to the proportion of

youthful entrants to the labor force, has declined steadily since that time
in the United States, from 38 percent in 1820 to 24 percent by 1940 (U.S. Bureau
of Census, 1960).
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The Age-Income Profile
The second component of income inequality in equation (1) is the
difference between the age group logarithmic mean income and the overall
population logarithmic mean income, squared.

If equity is defined in terms

of equality in the distribution of lifetime economic opportunities, appro
priately discounted, then income differences by age need not represent
inequitable variation in individual incomes, assuming of course that indi
viduals experience the sequence of average incomes associated with each age
interval in their lifetime.

Individuals may decide to redistribute these

earnings opportunities over their lifetime by means of investments in
physical and human capital.

According to this mechanism, age-earnings pro

files are interpreted as a reflection of the level of schooling and post
school training and occupational experience that individuals acquire at
an initial cost in anticipation of subsequent gain (Mincer, 1974). 2 Since
these human capital investments tend to be concentrated at the outset of the
life cycle, the greater the general level of these investments or the more
highly educated the population, the mor~ steeply upward sloping are age
earnings longitudinal profiles for a birth cohort.

The time individuals

allocate to earning income also varies systematically with age, displacing
the life cycle profile of earnings from that of wage rates or the economic
gains obtained per unit time worked.
But observations are not usually available on the income, earnings or
wages of cohorts over their lifetime; rather, analysis typically relies on
cross-sectional age groupings of a population at one time, from which a
"synthetic" age-income profile is obtained.

This cross-sectional (period)
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age-earnings profile will differ from the longitudinal (cohort) age-earnings
profile for two, possibly interrelated, reasons.

First, different age

groups in the cross section will tend to have different levels of education,
and other productive qualifications.

Yotmger age groups will in general

have received more years of schooling than older age groups, with the conse
quence that cross sectional age-earnings profiles will tend to increase more
slowly with age, peak earlier, and decline more rapidly than would the cor-res
ponding age-earnings profile from longitudinal data on individuals.

In popula

tions where the level of education has been increasing rapidly in recent
decades, the covariance between age and education for workers will be large
and negative.

Cross sectional age-wage profiles for such populations will

tend to be flatter at the younger ages than would be the case for a re
presentative individual progressing through their life eye.le in these
populations.
Holding constant the educational qualifications and hours worked of
the labor force, differences between longitudinal and cross sectional age
earnings profiles may remain.

This residual may be attributed to omitted pro

ductive characteristics of the work force or secular growth (or decline) of
labor productivity that workers capture due to physical capital accumulation
and the growth in technical knowledge.

If- this residual effect on the pro

ductivity of labor is proportional in its impact on the earnings of workers
at all ages, this age-neutral secular shift in productivity would contribute
to further reducing the positive slope (or increasing the negative slope) of
the age earnings profile as observed in the cross section. 3
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Within Age Group Inequality
The third component of income inequality in equation (1) is the with
in age group log variance.

Some procedure is called for to summarize these

measures of inequality over age groups to represent lifetime incomes.

The

cross-sectional decomposition suggests simply applying the current population structure,

nj/N,

as weights, but this is inadequate if there are import

ant sources of covariance between one time period and the next for individual
incomes.

Recent lifecycle econometric research has begun to estimate dynamic

earnings models based on U.S. panel survey data.

Persistent differences among

individuals are characterized by permanent individual effects in these models,
and transitory shocks to income are generally assumed to be serially correlated
(e.g., Lillard and Willis, 1978).

But shortage of panel data outside of the

· U.S. and the limited agreement on statistical specification for these dynamic
models has slowed progress toward empirical generalizations.

Only cross sectional

static summarizations of lifetime inequality are within the scope of this
paper.

Three Empirical Examples
Table 1 reports the empirical cotmterparts for this decomposition for
the Netherlands in 1950 for individual annual income recipients, the United
States in 1970 for all male annual income recipients, and Colombia in 1973
for all males with monthly money income.

Column (1) reports the age structure

of income recipients; column (2) the difference between the age group's
average (log) income and that of the entire population, squared, with those
age groups below the average showing a negative sign; and column (3) the with
in age group log variance.

Column (4) presents the sum of the within and

..
10table 1
Compcnents of the Variance of the Logarithms of Person.11 lncomc.s:Selected Countries
Country, Date and
£ge of Income
lecipient
(in years)

Total Cohort
Variance
Components

Veighted
Variance
Share

(1) X (4) •

(3)

(2) + (3) •
(4)

·(-)1.·043
(-) .047
.108
.220
.161
.013
(-) .068

.181
.347
.357
.430
.506
.608
.628

1.224
.394
.46S
.650
.667
.622
.697

.173

-

.644

Ullits

Squared Difference Between
Cohort and
Population
Mean 1Dco:11es

a/H

~ - y)

Proportion
of lococie

(1)

:J

- 2

Within
Cohort
lDcome

i

(2)

. 2

-

J:(yj'-· '1J>

(5)

trethedands,
19j0 1 Persons:

lS-20
21-29
30-39
40-49
S0-59

.17
.13

6o-69

.09

7f) or more

.06

Total

.14
.22
.19

1.00

.Od6

.087
.110
.090

.oss
.040

.644

1Jaited States,
1970 1 Hales:

.

14-19
20-24
2S-34
·3s-44
45-54
5S-64 ·
65 or more
total

.10*
.11
.20
.18
.18
.14
-.09**

(-)3.24'
<-> .1s
.23
.66
.37
.12
(-) .09

1.00

1.04
.82
~46.
.49

.59
.77

4.28
.97
.69
1.15
.96
.89

.64

.73

1.19

-

.42

.11
.13
.19
.16

.12

.06

1.19

'Colombia, October,
1973 1 .H.1les:

10-19
20-24
25-29
3<>-34

35-44
4S-54
55 or over
Total

.14

.u

.564
.028
.027

(-)
(-)

.14
.12

.011

.21

.14
.10

<->

1.26
1.37
1.55
1.62
1.81

.079
.043
.025

1.94

-

1.10

1.00

•proportion based on 2/3 of aea age 14-19

••proportion based baaed on men age 6S-74 only

...

2.33

1.83
1.40
1.58
1.70
1.89
1.98
2.36

-

.252
.214
.219
.209
.396

.275
.233

1.80
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between cohort components to the overall income inequalit y.

If these values

differ substanti ally by age group, then the earlier noted differenc es in age
structure s might help to explain variation in aggregate income inequalit y.
Column (5) multiplie s the age group's weight by its contribut ion to overall
income inequalit y.
In the case of the Netherlan ds, the contribut ion to inequalit y of the
youngest age group, age 15 to 20 is greatest; this group represent s less
than a tenth of the populatio n but accounts for 27 percent of overall income
inequalit y (i.e., .173/.644

s

.27).

The increase in the populatio n share of

this young group in the decade after 1950 contribut ed to increasin g measured
income inequalit y in the Netherlan ds by 1959 (Schultz, 1965).
The youngest age group is also the primary contribut or to overall in
come inequalit y in the United States, constitut ing again a tenth of the
estimated total number of males with income but contribut ing 35 percent
of the log variance (i.e •• 42/1.19 = .35).

The source of this inequalit y

due to the youngest labor force entrants differs in the two countries , how
ever.

In the Netherlan ds persons age 15-20 receive substanti ally lower

than average incomes, but these incomes are relativel y equally distribute d
within the age group, whereas in the United States the level of income for
young men age 14-19 is not only lower but the variance within the young
age group is also larger than any other age group.

In either case, swings

in the proportio n of the populatio n in the youngest age group could influ
ence measured

income inequalit y, without necessari ly implying any change

in inequalit y in lifetime economic opportun ities of persons in these soci
eties.

From this evidence for two high income countries there is support

for the hypothesi s that the slow tendency for income inequalit y to diminish
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in industrially advanced countries in this century could be partially
explained by their aging population structures.
Monthly male income data from Colombia do not support the view that
aggregate money income inequality is necessarily sensitive to changes in the
age structure.

The contrfbution to the total log variance attributable to

each age group is nearly constant, as shown in Column (4).

Though incomes

are below average in the youngest age group, the difference is smaller than
for the other two countries.

Also, as in the Netherlands, the log variance

of incomes within the youngest age groups is considerably smaller than with
in the older age groups.
In several respects the income data for Colombia differ from those
available for the United States and the Netherlands.

First, the Colombian

sample is more restrictive with regard to employment status; domestic
servants and tmpaid family workers are excluded because these workers tend to
receive all or a substantial fraction of their income in kind, e.g., room and
board, and youth are often found in these employment groups in Colombia.
Unpaid family workers with no income are also excluded from the U.S. data,
but they represent a far smaller share of the U.S. population.

Second,

income is measured in the Colombian Census over the preceding month rather
than over a year.

This convention could affect measured inequality and the

composition of the sample of income recipients, particularly before age 25
when young men are entering the labor force and terminating their education. 4
Educational achievement in Colombia has increased, perhaps more
rapidly than it has in the United States and the Netherlands.

But holding

constant for educational attainment of workers does not consistently in
crease the slope of the age-income profile, as postulated, because for the
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two younges t age groups the men who report incomes tend to be those members
of their cohort who have less than average levels of educatio n.

This selec

tion bias leads to the result that the average educatio n of the income
recipien ts increase s until age 25-29.

Only after age 29 does the adjustm ent

for the educatio nal attainme nt of Colombi an men increase the derivati ve of
5
the income profile with respect to age.

Extrapo lations of Age Structur e Effects on Income Inequal ity
A princip le differen ce between the income data for the two high in
come countrie s and Colombia is the relative insensi tivity of measured
overall income inequal ity in Colombia to the age structur e.

'

To illustra te

this differen ce between the U.S. and Colombi a, assume that the age-inco me
profile and within age group inequal ity did not change from the 1970-73
figures reported in Table 1.

The actual change over time in the age

structur e of males in these two countrie s would then imply the estimate s
of the overall log variance of male incomes shown in Table 2.

In the case

of the United States, the gradual decline in fertilit y and decrease in im
migratio n has had the effect of shifting the age structur e of the populat ion
toward older ages, with the calculat ed effect of reducing the log variance
of incomes from 1.57 in 1830 to 1.14 in 1950.

Swings in birth rates since

the depressi on have contribu ted subsequ ently to swings in the log variance
of incomes , increasi ng ten percent from 1950 to 1960, decreasi ng 14 percent
to 1980, and increasi ng again by ten percent by the year 2000.

These are

relative ly large variatio ns in measure s of income inequal ity that are
general ly quite stable over time within a country (Schultz , 1975).
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Table 2
Extrapolations of the Log Variance of Personal Incomes· of Males
over Age 14 for the United States and Colombia,
Based on Changing Age Structures,
and Assuming that Variance Components of Age Groups Do Not Change

Year of Age ~tr~c:ure
from Census or Projection

-· -

,

.

J.830
1870
1900
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2900
.

.

United States 1970
Table 1 1 Col. (4)

1.57
1.47
1.40

Colombia 1973
Table 1 1 Col. (4)

1.32

(1938) 1.78

1.14

(1951) 1.i7

1.25·

(1964) 1.78

1.19
1.07
· 1.13*
1.17*

. (1973) 1.80

-(1993) 1.77**
-

•census Bureau Series II that assumes cohort fertility r3te stable·
at 2.1 children per wocan.

**Projected by author assuming Coale and Demeny (1966) West level
18/19 tables applicable to males in two decades after 1973 Census and
fertility continues to decline, but more slowly after 1973. Age group
under 19 with income set equal to 2/3 of ages 15-19; age group with
incomes over 55 set equal to ages 55-64 only.
Source:

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1960) and subsequent CPS
publications on projections. Colombian Office of Statistics,
DANE (1977).
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In the case of Colombia, however, despite the destabilizing effect
of the demographic transition on the population's age structure since the
1940s, the estimated swings in the age structure from 1937 to 1993 have
little effect on the calculated log variance of male incomes.

If Colombia's

age-income profile and within age group income inequality is closer to that
in other low income countries than is that of the Netherlands and the United
States, the change in age structures that has been produced by the demographic
transition may not have been of itself a dominant factor in explaining
variation and change in overall money income inequality in less developed
countries among individuals.
Large residual differences across countries remain in within age group
income inequality.

At about age 30, when continuing education and early

labor force investments should be least important, the log variance of incomes
is about .35 in the Netherlands, .45 in the United States among males, and
1.6 in Colombia among males.

If these differences are not due to differences

in statistical sources, these are indeed large differences in lifetime inequality,
as are those extrapolated for the United States over the century 1830 to 1950.
Summing within age group inequality with population structure weights, i.e.,

t Col. (l)*Col. (3), this static measure of lifetime income inequality is
.40 in the Netherlands, .65 in the United States, and 1.68 in Colombia.
Conversely, lifecycle variation in income inequality approximated by deviations
of the age-income profile from the average, i.e., t Col. (1)*Col. (2), account
for 50 percent of the overall measure

of income inequality in the U.S.,

percent in the Netherlands, but only 7 percent in Colombia.

37
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Age Structure Effects on the Equilibrium Components of Income Inequality
The form of static decompositi on performed above focuses on only the
direct effect of changes in age structure on income inequality.

But the

age structure also indirectly affects measured inequality by changing the
age-income profile and by influencing within age group income inequality.
Estimation of the incidence and magnitude of these indirect demographic
effects calls for economic analysis of time series.

The former case is

. precisely the demographic -economic mechanism that Ronald Lee (1977) has
explored to explain long swings in the relative income status of a sequence
of U.S. birth cohorts of differing size.

Relatively large (small) cohorts

are expected to depress (inflate) their longitudina l path of earnings and thus
-

.

distort t~e cross sectional age-income profile.
The institution al and technical mechanisms determining the adjustment
of cohort earnings to cohort size remain \lllclear; do adjustments across
age groups occur in wage rates or in hours worked;does the latter adjust
ment come about through change in labor force participatio n rates,
\lllemployment rates or average hours worked by the employed?

Recent evi

dence for the United States indicates that most of the adjustment of the
labor market to the relatively large cohort entering the labor force in
the 1970s occurred through adjustment of wage rates by age, but age
specific unemployment rates and labor force participatio n rates also
reacted to cohort size (Freeman, 1979; Welch, 1979).

Further research is

required to clarify whether cohort relative size imparts a persisting life
time effect to the level of the cohort's longitudina l age-income profile,
or whether cohort size primarily influences the cohort's starting wage,
and that this initial effect subsequentl y wears off as members of the co
hort obtain more job-related experience.
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Macro economic indicators of the tightness of labor markets and the
effect of such tightness on inflation were reconsidered in the 1970s as
the labor force grew more rapidly and its age-sex composition changed.

Real

wage rates tended to deteriorate for youth with limited experience, and
yet wages increased for older, more experienced male workers.

The overall un

employment rate increased, but this development did not curb inflationary
pressures from some segments of the labor market.
Finally, within age group income inequality may be affected by
cohort relative size, other things being equal.

Since tight labor markets

are generally associated with diminished income inequality, within age group
inequality is likely to diminish for relatively small cohorts, and widen for
large cohorts.

But evidence of the effect of cohort size on the cross

sectional age-income profile and on within age group inequality is no more
than suggestive at this time.

Firm conclusions as to the magnitude and

persistence of these effects of cohort size on the structure of income inequality
in high and low income countries must await further research and probably analyses
of longer time series than have been available to date.
When younger groups in the labor force increase more rapidly than
do others, the effect of increased cohort size of the new entrants is to
augment overall measures of income inequality.

This will occur until the

rapidly growing age group's contribution to the overall log variance of
incomes is no longer greater than average (Col. 4).

This may occur between

about age 25 and 35, depending on the slope of the age-income profile.

As

the growth of the labor force entering cohorts falls below the average for
the population of income recipients, and the most rapid growth occurs in the
middle age groups, the indirect effects of relative cohort size are likely

18

to reduce overall income inequality.

The precise timing of this reversal

-

depends on several as yet unquantified offsetting factors.
In conclusion, the static decomposition illustrates how recent changes
in the age structure of high income countries may explain secular trends and
recent cycles in their measured income inequality.

The importance of these

direct age structure effects may be less marked in low income countries, at
least this appears to be the case for Colombia in 1973.

But the data for

Colombia may overstate the relative income position of youth, because un
paid family workers and other low productivity groups that are numerically
important in Colombia are not observed as individual income recipients.
Improved income data, corrections for selection ~ias,_a?d further analysis
of the family as the production unit may clarify,som~ of these issues in low
incom~ countries.
Conversely, patterns of part-time employment and the inclusion of
students and unemployed may understate the relative income position of youth
in the United States and thus exaggerate the importance of youth in overall
measures of inequality.

If the U.S. decomposition of log variance is repeated

for 1967, when earnings are reported from the U.S. Current Population Survey
for full-time year-round working males, the age pattern and level of inequality
is different from that for all males with income, but the finding stressed
in this paper of the overall sensitivity of measured inequality to the age
structure does not change.

The relative income status of men age 14-19 improves

(about doubles) and the within age group inequality diminishes, particularly
for men age 20-24.

But since the overall log variance of full-time year-round

earnings is 60 percent less than

that for all income recipients, the
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total cohort contribution of youth age 14-19 (column 4, Table 1) remains about
four times the overall average log variance, similar to that reported in
Table 1 for all income recipients in 1970.(See summary and sources of data
for 1967 in Schultz, 1975.)

Although there are reasons to prefer measures

of inequality based on wage rates or restricted to comparisons of persons
working in the labor market the same amount of time, this is not a conunon
practice and has not been the empirical basis for the widely observed relation
ship between economic dev~lopment and income inequality (Kusnic and DaVanzo,
1980; Schultz, 1981, Section D).
Indirect dynamic effects of cohort relative size on cohort earnings
and on within cohort inequality, possibly associated with the demographic
transition, may also be responsible for increasing measured income inequality.
Since these latter two effects of relative cohort size on income inequality
have a clear bearing on inequality in lifetime income opportunities, they
warrant more explicit study in which the direct effects of age structure are
held constant.

Data examined here relate to only three countries, each at

only one time period.

They do not provide more than an illustration of the

proposed decomposition methodology.

They do suggest, however, that there

are substantial differences between countries in within age group inequality.
They also imply that at least in high income countries changes in overall in
equality may be strongly influenced by age structure shifts, both secular
trends and long swings.

Many standard interpretations of patterns in over

all inequality may need to be revised when these salient effects of age
structure are suitably identified and removed from the data.
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FAMILY COMPOSITION AND INCOME INEQUALITY
Two approaches to income inequality are found in the economics litera
ture:

one emphasizes the distribution of endowments and productive op

portunities among individuals over their lifetimes, while the other treats
income per family, adjusted somehow for its current consumption needs.

The

former is oriented toward understanding the determinants of earnings of pro
ductive factors and their personal distribution, whereas the latter is
concerned with the distribution of consumption and economic welfare.
As an income recipient unit, families differ in size and composition,
and some studies suggest that family composition responds to the economic
endowments and opportunities of its potential members.

Whereas the age

structure of a population was previously interpreted as given and thus
exogenously affecting the distrfbution of income aero$& individuals, it is
not always reasonable to assume that the size ~nd composition of families is
exogenously affecting the size distribution of family incomes.
The second half of this paper explores how family income inequality
might be approached with decomposition methods to clarify two distinct
demographic processes that modify family size and composition:

the propensity

of adult to share living arrangements, and the level of surviving fertility
per adult.
One common procedure to normalize the distribution of income across
families for family composition is to express the income of the family (or
6 This per capita family income
unrelated individual) in per capita terms.
measure of economic welfare,or consumption opportunities is adopted here for
simple illustrative purposes.

A Framework
fo r S tu d y o f
Demands U n d
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The variance of the logarithm s of family per capita income or income
"inequali ty" can then be decomposed into three variance and three co
variance terms as follows:

V(yn) ., V(y) + V(a) + V(f) - 2C(y,a) - 2C{y,f) + 2C(a,f) (2)

where

V(.)

represent the variance and covarianc e of the re

and C(.,.)

spective argument (s).

Because the adult size and fertility index contribut e

to a reduction in family per capita income, the first two covarianc e terms
involving adult size and the fertility index with family income are subtracte d
from the sum of the three component variances .
The covarianc e between family income and adult family size and between
family income and fertility can be e~onomic ally interpret ed as the responsiv e
ness of these aspects of family compositi on to income.· But economic analyses
of the demand for children and marriage rely heavily on relative price variation
across populatio ns that is captured in the differenc es in the shadow value of
time (or wage rates) of men and women.

Furthermo re, if investmen ts in children,

such as schooling , are substitut es for numbers of children, differenc es in
fertility may parallel inversely investmen ts in populatio n quality.

Hence,

the next step in elaborati ng this framework is to distingui sh between the
potential earned income or wage rate of adult males and females, with the
expectati on that female potential income will be inversely related to fertility
due to the predomina nce of own-price effects, whereas male income will be
weakly related to fertility , positivel y or negativel y, depending on a variety
of factors that determine the magnitude of offsettin g income and price
effects (Schultz, 1976).
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It is not t.mcommon to focus attention on the covariance between
family income and total family size, but, as suggested above, this procedure
may conceal the more interesting relationshi ps between income and the
subcomponen ts of family size that represent distinct demands.

Empirical Illustration :

Colombia 1973

Table 3 reports the means, variances, and covariances of measures
of unrelated individual and family income and family composition for
Colombia, stratified by age of head of household.

The data are, as before, from a

four percent public use sample of the noninstitut ional questionnai res of
the October 1973 Population and Housing Census of Colombia (DANE, 1977).
Only units reporting some income in the month before the Census are
considered.
Several empirical regularitie s may be noted.

The number of adults

per family increases steadily with the age of head, from 2.1 at ages
15-19 to 3.7 at ages 50-64. 7 The (surviving) fertility index (i.e.,
children per adult) increases from .38 at ages 15-19 to a maximum 1.14
at ages 35-39, and thereafter falls to .45 in the last age group.

The total

number of persons per family therefore increases rapidly from 2.9 at ages 15-19
to 5.6 at ages 35-39, and is more or less constant thereafter, as the share
of adults in the family slowly increases.

Family income also increases with

the age of its head, but at a slower rate than does family size, peaking at
ages 45-49.

Consequentl y, family per capita income reaches its largest value

in this cross section for young families whose heads are ages 20-24, and
declines thereafter until ages 45-49.

---=·

-

..a.,•v
· Component• of the J.ogadtbmic Va~ce of Family and Unrelated lndividuai Incomes• by Age of Bea4&
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2.11
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Family income inequality, or the variance of the logarithms of
family incomes, increases monotonically with age from 1.05 at age 15-19 to
1.70 at age 50-64.

Family per capita income inequality tends to be

larger and also increases with age until the age group 35-39, when the
proportion of children in the family peaks; inequality then varies within
a narrow range across subsequent age groups.

Comparison with column (3)

of Table 1 indicates that the within cohort variance of log incomes of
individual men varies by age at a slightly higher level than does family
per capita income inequality by age in Table 3.

Adult Family Size and Income
The first covariance term in the full decomposition,

C(y,a), repre

sents the association between family income and the number of adults liv
ing together in a family.

In a simple regression of the log of family

income on the log of the number of adults in the family:

where

e1

in row 8 of Table 3 is the estimate of the elasticity of family
8

income with respect to number of adults in the family.

If the propensity of

adults to live together were not correlated with their potential income
contribution, their own and that of others in their family, and our measure
of family income captured fully the sum of the potential income of its adult
members, then this elasticity would be approximately one.

Family incomes

would then tend to increase in proportion to the number of adults in the family.
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The Colombian relationship between family income and number of adults
per family implies approximately a unitary elasticity from age 25-29 to
50-64, varying from .83 to 1.01.
of this elasticity from tmity.

But several factors could explain departures
First, there may be economies of scale in

household production and thus gains from specialization within the family
household that encourages some degree of combination and coordination of
adult activities.

Also the production and rearing of children at certain

stages of the life cycle is an important factor in the combination of adults
into families in most societies.

Technology of production, firm-specific

training, and information costs of monitoring activities may work to extend
further the productive limits of the family beyond the nuclear childrearing
unit.

The production determinants of adult family composition is a largely

unexplored field for theoretical speculation and empirical study
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1979).
The effect of numbers of adults on family income may also be dis
torted by imperfect measures of family income or production.

Goods and

services produced and consumed within the family are often omitted from
measures of family income.

The proportion of uonmarket income in the

family's real total income may vary with number of adults, e.g., in two
adult families compared with one-adult "families."

The propor-tion of

total income consumed in nonmarket forms may also vary systematically
over certain periods of the life cycle, such as during the early years
of childbearing before the first offspring begins to contribute important
ly to family income.

This hypothesis could explain the markedly lower

values of the adult-income elasticity for families whose heads are between
the ages of 15 and 24.
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Just as the composition of income between market and nonmarket
sources may be affected by the number of adults in the family, the potential
lifetime wealth or permanent income of individuals may influence the demand
for goods and services that are more economically produced in larger (or
smaller) units, or in the market or nonmarket sectors (Kusnic and Davanzo,
1980).

The nuclear family is thought to facilitate childbearing and the

transmission of productive skills and culture to the young.

As more of

these functions are performed outside of the family, and the share of
adult lifetimes devoted to childbearing decreases, the need for a permanent
nuclear family may diminish, or at least that is concluded from some studies
of modern industrialized societies.

As the wages for men and women in the

marketplace approach equality in some high income countries, the

marriage

gains from specialization in market and nonmarket production are reduced and
the opportunity cost of single household ''privacy" and mobility may decrease.
The recent increase in the proportionof single person households· in many
high income countries may be attributed to the high income elasticity of
demand for this form of "privacy" (Michael, .!:!_al., 1980).
In sum, the proportionate relationship between family income and
number of adults in the family implies that the combination of adults into
family units is not associated in Colombia with augmenting or diminishing
appreciably the inequality of family per capita income.

This is a relatively

neutral factor of family composition, except during the early childrearing
years, ages 15 to 25.

During these years parents produce nonmarket income

in the form of child care services that are excluded from personal income accounts.
A more comprehensive measure of family income that included household nonmarket
production and child care services might, therefore, increase the estimated
income-adult elasticity for these younger age groups, and probably also increase slightly the estimated elasticity at later ages.

9

28
Fertility and Family Income
Fertility and family income tend to be inversely related, with the
associated covariance obtaining a maximum value

in the Colo0bian case

at ages 30~34 (Table 3), and decreasing thereafter slowly to the oldest
age group.

Here the causal relationship is thought to operate primarily

from the level of family income to the level of fertility, and to be
achieved th~ough voluntary choice rather than any form of biological
predisposition.

Of course, children may also contribute by their efforts

to family income, though this positive effect should not be substantial
until a child is about ten years of age, and,by our measuring convention,
this child upon reaching age 15 is counted as an adult even though the
average age at first marriage in Colombia is now eight years later, at
age 23.

The observed negative association at all ages suggests.the level
.

.

.

of surviving fertility systematically declines with increases in family
income • . Thus, differences in surviving fertility across families in
-

Colombia increases inequality in family per capita income •. The negative
covariance between income and fertility never reaches, in absolute value
terms, the magnitude of the positive covariance between income and adult
family size, but remains substantial.

The collapse of income-fertility

differentials would reduce overall inequality in family per capita income
by 12 to 18 percent from ages 20-24 and 45-49.
In the regression of the logarithm of the fertility index on family
income:

the income-fertility elasticity,

s2 ,

is reported in row 9,Table 3, and con

verted in row 10 into the derivative of change in the number of children
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income inequality is less readily ascribed an economic interpretation
and, given its modest size, it will be discussed only briefly here.
Large collections of adults may be synonymous with extended families.
It has been hypothesized that extended family structures may lower the
cost of children and contribute to higher fertility.

With more adults

to coordinate and specialize in home child care activities, for which
there may exist economies of scale, the opportunity cost of children may
be reduced.

But there is no evidence in support of this hypothesis

from these data; extended families with more adults are associated with
somewhat lower levels of fertility per adult.

The covariance between

the logarithm of the fertility index and logarithm of the number of adults
in the family, C(f,a) in row 7, is about -.03 to -.05 from ages 25-29 to
45-49.
CONCLUSIONS
It is essential that we get behind overall measures of individual and
family income inequality and identify regularities among subcomponents that
have economic and behavioral meaning.

The first part of this paper analyzed

individual income inequality in three countries, and sought to distinguish
between inequality directly associated with the age structure of the popu
lation, that associated with the cross sectional age-income profile, and that
remaining within age groups.

The first two sources of aggregate inequality

warrant more study, but the issues of equity and economic inequality are
perhaps most clearly associated with the third component of inequality, that
which arises within a birth cohort.
The larger the share of youth, age 14-19, among income recipient units
the greater is the aggregate log variance in individual incomes in the
Netherlands and in the United States.

Given the currently documented
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pattern of income inequality within and across age groups, the secular
trend toward an older age composition in the United States could directly
account for a decrease of one-third in U.S. individual income inequality
since the Civil War,as found by Lindert and Williamson (1976).

Indirect

economic effects of changes in age structures should reinforce this extrapolated trend in income inequality based on direct effects of compositional changes.
Age structure differences between Colombia and the United States do not
explain, however, the much greater overall inequality in Colombia.

With-

in age group inequality is more than twice as large in Colombia as in the
United States, while inequality is a third less in the Netherlands than
in the U.S;, independent of age structure.

Comparing income inequality by

age across populationsis complicated, however, by the different employment
opportunities open to youth in countries at different levels of development,
and in particular, family unpaid jobs.

The empirical data considered here

suggest- that the widely observed relationship between modern economic growth
and decreasing aggregate income inequality may be exaggerated by differences
in age structures across contemporary populations and over time within more
industrially and demographically advanced countries.
The second part of this paper sought to divide family composition into
two distinct behavioral elements associated with fertility and the propensity
of adults to live together.

The latter adult aspect of family structure may

in some circumstances respond to income opportunities across the population.
But in the case of Colombia in 1973, the elasticity of family income with
respect to number of adults in the family was nearly one, indicating that
this process was not a major source of inequality in per capita family
income •. Fertility, on the other hand, was distinctly higher in low income
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families, adding to the inequality in per capita family income in Colombia.
Replication of this simple decomposition analysis in other countries at
different stages in the demographic transition and at different income
levels might clarify how fertility by family income varies with particular
patterns of economic growth and with different emphases on education, public
health and family planning activities.
The avenues open to research are many.

To better understand family

income inequality, behavioral and institutional causal interpretations are
needed of component regularities.

Micro economic theory, standard techniques

of statistical decomposition and estimation, and common procedures of
age and sex stratification may all be useful in advancing this goal.

The

growing public availability of large household surveys and samples of censuses
for manr countries and time periods provides the opportunity to proceed in
a variety of directions as explored here, withou~ being limited to standard
tabulations and income accollll.ting frameworks. Age structures of the income
recipient population, fertility (and mortality) differences by family income,
and the market labor supply behavior of women, appear to be essential parts
to this puzzle.
whole.

The parts must fit together and add up to a consistent

The framework that takes form from this research should facilitate

more precise and meaningful measurement of income inequality than has been
seen in the past.

It should also suggest new approaches to assembling

these components into a integrated two-level household-aggregate model of
economic demographic development, one that has been sorely needed since
Malthus's grand design went wide of the mark a hundred years ago.
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FOOTNOTES
1

see for exam ple Schu ltz (1965 ), Pyat t (1966 ), and Fei,
Ranis

and Kuo (1978 ).

The log varia nce of incomes assig ns great er weigh t
to
ineq ualit ies among the poor than among the rich, in
contr ast with the
Gini coef ficie nt and the coef ficie nt of varia tion,
which assig n equa l
weig hts to the same abso lute diffe rence s in income
betwe en rich perso ns
and betwe en poor perso ns. Altho ugh ranki ngs of inequ
ality acros s
coun tries or socio econo mic group s tend to be relat ively
insen sitiv e to
which of these alter nativ e meas ures of ineq ualit y is
adopt ed (Atki nson,
1970 ), the empi rical conc lusio ns repor ted here may
not ::.bold_ :for
other summary meas ures of ineq ualit y.
2
see Rosen (1977 ) for discu ssion of an earni ngs funct
ion as a
struc turai equa tion and as a reduc ed-fo rm equa tion.
The disti nctio n
does not seem param ount in this conte xt but is impo
rtant for the
economic inter preta tion of the earni ngs funct ion and
its param eters .
3

Anal ysis of the diver gence of long itudi nal age-i ncom
e profi les

from cross -sect iona l age-i ncom e profi les for indiv idual
s in the Unite d
State s from 1947 to 1970 sugg ests that secu lar prod
uctiv ity gains
have been rough ly age-n eutra l for males age 25-54 ,
for whom the avera ge
annu al hours of work have changed least (Sch ultz, 1975
).
. 4In one way the measurement of income durin g the last
month helps
to stand ardiz e income for the durat ion of time work
ed, and provi des a
bette r appro xima tion for the wage rate. Cons equen
tly, stude nts
who would work for pay only durin g summers would be
inclu ded with
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artificially low incomes in the Dutch and U.S. statistics, but are probably
excluded from the Colombian Census sample.

On

the other hand, workers

who were entirely unemployed last month with no other sources of income
would be unavoidably excluded from the Colombian sample and might be in
cluded in the U.S. and Dutch data if they found any employment or received
any welfare-tra nsfer income during the preceding year.

Yet unemployment

in Colombia is not frequent by conventiona l standards according to the
1973 census:

two to five percent of men ages 10 to 24 are unemployed.

Our reliance on the logarithmic variance of incomes to summarize
income inequality does not permit the retention of persons with no income
in our sample.

But if persons with no income are to be included, the uni

verse of income recipient units must be defined on new criteria such as
the individual' s labor force status.

The disabled, housekeeper s, pensioners,

and discouraged workers who report themselves as being outside of the labor
force are thereby arbitrarily excluded.

It would be preferable to use only

exogenous characteris tics for determining the study population, such as
sex and age.

If men of a specific age were considered, additional problems

arise of placing a value on outputs of (or inputs into) all household pro
duction, schooling and training activities.

To define a measure of "full"

income comprehensi vely as both money market income and the cash value of
all services and goods consumed or invested in kind involves one in many
more unresolved conceptual and empirical problems (Kusnic and Davanzo, 1980).
5Tbis
adjustment is performed by regressing the natural logarithm
of individual income on a series of dummy variables defined over the age
intervals included in Table 1.

By including in this regression a series

of dummy variables for four levels of education, or a continuous variable
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for years of educati on of the individ ual, we "adjust " the age profile
estima tes for educati on.

The squared deviati ons of the log income profile

from the overal l mean become:

(-).200 ; (-).005 ; .027; .110; .216; .203;

.038, respec tively for the age groups .

The deviati on effects are increas ed

for age groups beyond age 30, and decreas ed for those below age 25.
6

An alterna tive approac h would divide family income by a weighte d

sum of family members, where the weight s assigne d to differe nt types of
person s in the family would be dictate d by the purpose s of the analys is,
such as the study of consum ption or produc tion.

For exampl e, it has been

argued that consum ption require ments of a person vary by age and sex.
Real income availab le for consum ption may tend to be oversta ted by the
per capita normal ization of family income in familie s with a relativ ely
large number of childre n,

and conver sely unders tated in familie s with

dispro portion ate numbers of adults .

An

alterna tive normal ization

scheme could also be examined that assigns weight s to childre n which are
some variab le fractio n of those assigne d to adults, reflect ing crudely
the lower produc tion potent ial or consum ption require ments of childre n
than of adults .
7
Referen ces are to antilog s of the means of logarit hmic variab les

reporte d in Table 3.

For exampl e, the number of adults per unit, whose

head is age 50-64 is 3.7 • exp (1.3).
8

The simple regress ion coeffic ient in this case,

e1 ,

is equal to

the covaria nce of tnY and tn n, divided by the varianc e of tn n.
a
a

exampl e, in a family whose head was betwee n the ages of 30 and 34,
B1 • C(y,a)/ V(a) = .179/.1 77 • 1.01.

For
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9one may wonder, however, whether the single loglinear relation
ship estimated here does not embody several distinct relationships for
different family sizes and production technologies.

More research might

isoiate whether the relationship that holds from one to two adult
families continues to fit the data for three, four and five adult families,
and whether the relationship between family income and number of adults
per family is the same in populations where the household head is a rural
landless worker, owner-operator-farmer, urban self employed, or urban wage
salary employee.

10

The fertility demand equation could also be viewed as conditioned

on family income per adult or an average "wage rate", since the elasticity
of family income with respect to adult size is approximately one.
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